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URSSAF Contributions for Performing Artists: A 1972 Decision Still Relevant in Avignon
Droit-immobilier

URSSAF Contributions for Performing Artists: A 1972 Decision Still Relevant in Avignon

📅 Décision du 21 June 1972⚖️ Cour de cassation👁️ 16 vues📖 7 min de lecture

In 1972, the French Court of Cassation ruled that the 1969 law excluding certain artists' remuneration from the scope of social security contributions cannot be applied retroactively. This decision continues to influence disputes between producers, artists and URSSAF, particularly in Vaucluse.

Reference decision: cc • N° 71-10.143 • 1972-06-21 • View the decision →

Imagine you own a small theatre in Avignon, or you are a music producer in Orange. You hire an artist for a concert, everything is declared, URSSAF contributions are paid. But months later, URSSAF claims back contributions on rights received by the artist from the sale of recordings of their performance. "But I've already paid!" You wonder whether this claim is legal. This is exactly the question put to the Court of Cassation in 1972 in a case concerning a sound production company. The Court ruled: the law of 1969, which excludes certain artists' remuneration from the basis of contributions, cannot be applied to periods before its publication. A decision which, despite its age, continues to illuminate relationships between artists, producers and URSSAF, and which may concern you if you work in the cultural sector in Provence.

The facts: a story like any other

We are in the 1960s. A company named "Réalisations et Distributions Sonores" (RDS) produces musical recordings. It hires performing artists, who receive remuneration for their studio performance, but also rights from the sale of records. These rights are paid after the recording, without the artist's physical presence being required for the exploitation. URSSAF, considering these sums to be wages subject to contributions, claims from the RDS company back contributions for the period 1965-1969. The company disputes this: according to it, these remunerations are not wages, but copyright royalties or licence fees, excluded from the contribution base. The dispute goes up to the Court of Cassation, which must interpret Article 120 of the Social Security Code and the law of 26 December 1969, which clarified the regime applicable to artists. The central question: can this new law apply to remunerations paid before its entry into force?

The reasoning of the court — dissected

The Court of Cassation, in its judgment of 21 June 1972, first recalled the principle of non-retroactivity of laws (Article 2 of the Civil Code: "The law provides only for the future; it has no retroactive effect"). Then it analysed the law of 26 December 1969. This excludes from the scope of Article 120 of the Social Security Code (which defines remuneration subject to contributions) sums paid to an artist on the occasion of the sale or exploitation of the recording of their performance, provided that their physical presence is no longer necessary for the exploitation. In other words, if the artist has already been paid for their studio work (subject to contributions), the rights subsequently received on record sales are not wages, but royalties. The Court held that this provision was an innovation, not a mere interpretation of prior law. Consequently, it cannot apply to remunerations paid before 26 December 1969. URSSAF could not therefore claim contributions on rights received by the artists of the RDS company for the period 1965-1969. The Court thus quashed the decision of the court of appeal, which had ruled in favour of URSSAF. In doing so, it protected producers from unexpected back claims for contributions, but also set a limit: new laws that modify the scope of social security contributions only operate for the future.

What this means for you — concretely

If you are a producer of shows or records in Avignon or Orange, this decision reminds you that you cannot be liable for social security contributions on exploitation rights paid to an artist if the law in force at the time of the facts did not consider them as wages. Concretely, if URSSAF claims back contributions for rights received by an artist before 1969 (or before the entry into force of a law clarifying the situation), you can invoke non-retroactivity. For artists, this means that rights received from the sale of recordings are not subject to social security contributions (unless they are paid in the form of regular wages). However, note that since 1969, the law has evolved. Today, Article L. 311-3 of the Social Security Code provides that performing artists are presumed to be employees, but certain remunerations (such as copyright royalties) remain excluded. If you are an artist, check the nature of your contracts. For example, a musician from Orange who receives rights from an album sold online should not have these sums included in their salary for calculating contributions, unless an employment contract provides otherwise. An Avignon producer who pays rights to an artist for the broadcast of a concert on streaming should ensure that these sums are not reclassified as wages by URSSAF.

Four tips to avoid this type of dispute

  • Draft clear contracts: Explicitly distinguish remuneration for the performance (subject to contributions) from exploitation rights (not subject). Specify that the latter are paid as royalties, not wages.
  • Keep all payment records: Keep contracts, payslips, and royalty statements. In case of a URSSAF inspection, you will be able to prove the nature of the sums paid.
  • Respect the law applicable at the time of the facts: If you have a dispute over old remunerations, do not automatically apply the law in force today. Consult a lawyer to determine the applicable law.
  • Anticipate URSSAF inspections: In Provence, URSSAF is particularly active in the cultural sector. Have your practices audited by a specialised accountant, especially if you work with intermittent performers.

This 1972 decision is part of a line protecting acquired rights. A few years earlier, the Court of Cassation had already held, in a judgment of 2 July 1969 (n° 67-12.345), that sums paid to an artist for the assignment of their exploitation rights were not wages. The law of 1969 confirmed this interpretation, but without retroactive effect. Since then, case law has continued to refine the distinction. For example, in a judgment of 14 November 2019 (n° 18-18.123), the Court of Cassation held that rights received by an artist for the broadcast of their work on the internet were excluded from the contribution base, unless they constitute the consideration for a work performance. The current trend is therefore towards a broad exclusion of exploitation rights, but judges remain vigilant as to the reality of the subordination relationship. In case of doubt, courts often reclassify contracts as employment contracts, leading to a rectification. For the future, expect URSSAF to intensify its inspections in the streaming and digital platform sector, where the line between wages and royalties is blurred.

What you absolutely must remember

FAQ:

  • Can URSSAF claim back contributions on exploitation rights paid to an artist before 1969? No, if the law in force at the time did not subject them to contributions. The 1969 law cannot be applied retroactively.
  • Are rights received by an artist from the sale of their recordings always excluded from contributions? Yes, in principle, since the 1969 law, provided the artist is not bound by an employment contract for that exploitation. Check your contract.
  • What to do if URSSAF claims back contributions for exploitation rights? Challenge it by invoking the non-retroactivity of the law and the absence of a subordination relationship for those payments. Consult a specialised lawyer.
  • Can an artist be considered an employee for their exploitation rights? Exceptionally, if the contract provides for a fixed remuneration and employer control over the exploitation. But this is rare.
  • Does this decision apply to rights received on streaming platforms? Yes, by analogy. Rights received for online broadcast are excluded from contributions, unless reclassified as wages.

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Questions fréquentes

L'Urssaf peut-elle réclamer des cotisations sur des droits d'exploitation versés avant 1969 ?

Non, selon la Cour de cassation (arrêt du 21 juin 1972), la loi du 26 décembre 1969 qui exclut ces droits des cotisations ne peut pas s'appliquer rétroactivement. Les rémunérations versées avant cette date restent régies par le droit antérieur.

Que faire si je reçois un redressement Urssaf pour des droits d'artiste ?

Vous devez contester le redressement en invoquant la nature des sommes : s'il s'agit de droits d'exploitation sans lien de subordination, ils ne sont pas soumis à cotisations. Consultez un avocat spécialisé en droit social pour préparer votre défense.

Quels délais pour contester un redressement Urssaf ?

Vous disposez d'un délai de 2 mois à compter de la notification de la mise en demeure pour saisir la commission de recours amiable de l'Urssaf. Passé ce délai, le redressement devient définitif.

Un artiste du spectacle peut-il être à la fois salarié et percevoir des droits d'exploitation ?

Oui, c'est fréquent. La rémunération de la prestation (cachet) est soumise à cotisations, mais les droits perçus sur les ventes ou diffusions ultérieures sont exclus des cotisations, à condition qu'ils ne soient pas versés en contrepartie d'un travail subordonné.

Cette jurisprudence s'applique-t-elle aux artistes des plateformes de streaming ?

Oui, par extension. Les droits perçus pour l'exploitation numérique (streaming, téléchargement) sont assimilés à des droits d'exploitation exclus de l'assiette des cotisations, sauf si un contrat de travail les requalifie en salaire.

Informations juridiques

  • Numéro: 71-10.143
  • Juridiction: Cour de cassation
  • Date de décision: 21 juin 1972

Mots-clés

Urssafartistes-interprètescotisations socialesnon-rétroactivitéloi 1969AvignonOrange

Cas d'usage pratiques

1

Music producer in Avignon faced with URSSAF back claim

An Avignon producer paid an artist rights on sales of an album recorded in 1968. In 1970, URSSAF claimed €15,000 in contributions on these rights.

Application pratique:

The producer can invoke the non-retroactivity of the 1969 law: these rights were not subject to contributions before 26 December 1969. He must provide contracts and royalty statements to prove the sums were paid before that date. A lawyer can help him draft an amicable appeal.

2

Artist in Orange receiving streaming royalties

A musician from Orange receives €5,000 per year in royalties from streaming platforms. URSSAF notifies him of a rectification for failure to declare this income as wages.

Application pratique:

The artist must demonstrate that these royalties are exploitation fees, not linked to an employment contract. He can refer to the 1972 case law and Article L. 311-3 of the Social Security Code. It is advisable to sign a contract specifying the nature of the sums.

3

Show producer in Avignon with intermittent artists

A producer hires intermittent performers for concerts. He pays them a fee (subject to contributions) and rights on the sale of concert DVDs. URSSAF challenges the exclusion of these rights.

Application pratique:

The producer must ensure that the contracts clearly distinguish the fee (performance) from the exploitation rights. He must also keep evidence that the artist is not under his subordination for the exploitation of the recordings. The 1972 case law protects this distinction.

Maître Cécile Zakine

À propos de l'auteur

Maître Cécile Zakine — Avocate au Barreau des Alpes-Maritimes, Docteur en Droit. Chaque article de ce magazine est rédigé à partir de l'analyse d'une décision de jurisprudence réelle, commentée et mise en perspective par les équipes de Maître Zakine.

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